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PRIVATIZING EDUCATION WITH THE PUBLIC’S PURSE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2012
GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ON CHARTER SCHOOLS

ABSTRACT
Charter schools have recently become a hot topic of debate in the United States. For parents who cannot afford private schooling or moving to another school district, charter schools
seem to be an attractive option. These schools, which are often argued to outperform traditional
schools, offer an alternative path to public education which allows teachers more flexibility to
employ innovative strategies in the classroom. In order to expedite the creation of such schools,
Republicans in the Georgia General Assembly called for the amending of the Georgia Constitution which would allow the state to approve charters by circumventing the publicly elected local
school board. This study analyzes the more recent political history of the Commission, the debate
surrounding the amendment, and ultimately the vote itself for Amendment 1.

INDEX WORDS: Georgia politics, Charter schools, Ballot propositions, Voting behavior
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1

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, charter schools have recently become a popular alternative to
traditional public schooling. Charter schools generally receive federal and state funding but are
not subject to the same regulations and standards as their traditional counterparts. With more autonomy for creativity and teaching innovations, families in failing school systems began flocking
toward the idea of charter schools. In 2009, President Obama’s initiative “Race to the Top”
sweetened the deal even more, granting federal money to states that created robust and innovative strategies that addressed major challenges facing their educational systems (White House
2013). The study presented here analyzes Georgia’s race towards charter schools.
1.1

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to analyze the vote for Amendment 1, a ballot proposition

from the 2012 Georgia General Election that would enable the state to create charter schools. Not
only is this study relevant to understanding the growing support for charter schools; we can also
draw many inferences about the relationship between charter school advocacy and voting behavior by analyzing the vote. On November 6, 2012 Georgia made history as the first state to amend
its constitution in favor of state-sponsored charter schools (O’Sullivan 2012). Therefore, analyzing the vote for Amendment 1 in Georgia not only leads us to a better understanding of the dynamic support networks for charter schools but also serves as a model for prospective states
looking to enact similar educational policies. The study begins by offering a detailed account of
the recent charter schools debate in Georgia followed by an analysis of the campaign for and
against the Amendment. Secondly, several camps of literature on voting behavior are introduced
to serve as a roadmap for the model employed in this analysis. Lastly, by examining a host of
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demographic, educational “need” and political variables, we make several general claims about
the public’s attitude towards charter schools in the state of Georgia.
1.1.1

Georgia Charter Schools Commission

Should parents have the right to choose an alternative public school for their children if
they feel that the existing system is underperforming? On the surface, the charter schools debate
in Georgia focused primarily on the issue of school choice. For those who could not relocate to
another school district or could not afford private schooling, charter schools seemed to offer a
solution to parents desperately looking for change in their child’s education. But with local
school boards not granting charter applications as fast as the Georgia legislature would have
liked, politicians decided to step in. The idea was to create a state commission that would speed
up the charter granting process and finally give parents and students an option for school choice.
But once the commission actually began signing charters, the solution was not as promising as
some may have hoped.
In 2008 the Georgia House Education Committee endorsed House Bill 881 which essentially created a “back door for the state to divert local dollars to fund charter schools that the local school boards did not want” (Downey 2011a). When then-governor Sonny Perdue signed HB
881 into law on May 13, 2008 he authorized the creation of the Georgia Charter Schools Commission, the bill’s prized progeny. This law allowed charter-seeking applicants to directly present
their case to the GCSC for approval, an autonomous state-level entity, even if the request had
been previously dismissed by the school board (Georgia General Assembly 2007-2008).
As one may predict, any time a governing body grants itself power (especially when that
particular power was solely overseen by some other entity) problems naturally arise. The case of
charter schools in Georgia was no exception. One such problem first and foremost usually con-
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cerns money. If we want to build new schools how shall they be funded? Before the GCSC,
state-chartered schools were only authorized to receive federal and state funding (unlike traditional schools which receive federal, state and local monies); however, under the GCSC, commission-chartered schools would receive funding at all three levels, even if the local board opposed the charter mandate in the first place (Downey 2011a).
In June 2009 state-charted schools strapped for cash and on the verge of closing their
doors became eligible to receive local funding contingent upon GCSC reauthorization (Dodd
2009). Though this was great news for existing state-chartered schools like the Ivy Preparatory
Academy in Norcross and the Scholars Academy State Elementary in Riverdale who were in dire
need of economic stimulus, local districts soon realized they had lost the power over their own
purse (Dodd 2009).
The GCSC’s authority to approve charters and divvy up local dollars irrespective of the
localities themselves represented legal loopholes at their finest. For many, the legislature was
sending a message to local districts to “pay more, say less” (Downey 2011a). The issue of funding schools is especially concerning for many considering the frequency with which pundits and
politicians often refer to the destitution of the educational system in America. On average, local
districts provide about “45 percent of what it now costs to educate a child”; charter schools are
hard-pressed to survive without it, and local districts cannot afford to save them (Downey
2011a).
Local boards losing their voice as a result of the 2008 Act leads us to another problem,
perhaps the most disputed, regarding the variety of constitutional and egalitarian oversights by
the legislature. When Gwinnett Schools lost nearly $850,000 as a consequence of the Ivy Preparatory Academy of Norcross receiving local matching funds when it reestablished its charter with
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the GCSC, the rumors of lawsuits quickly became a reality (Dodd 2009b).
In 2010, seven school systems filed a case with the Fulton County Superior Court arguing
that the state did not have the constitutional authority to grant local dollars to commissionchartered schools.1 The arguments aligning on each side of the debate were fairly simple in theory. The GCSC either was or was not operating within the confines of the Georgia Constitution.
Thomas Cox, who represented DeKalb and Atlanta public schools during the case argued that the
“Constitution specifies that public education is under the management and control of county
boards of education," not by state-created commissions (Dodd 2010). Conversely, Bruce Brown,
an attorney representing the charter schools claimed that “nothing in the Georgia Constitution
gives the local district a monopoly on public education” (Dodd 2010). In the end, Judge Wendy
Shoob sided with the charter schools upholding the mechanism of local funding and maintaining
the constitutionality of the GCSC.
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the public school systems appealed their case to the Georgia
Supreme Court. The state high court focused primarily on the constitutionality and legitimacy of
the GCSC (Downey 2011b). Chiefly, does the state have constitutional authority to create and
fund charter schools “over the objection of local school boards?” (Downey 2011b). Lawyers representing the state and the GCSC argued that the authority to create such schools was covered
under the “special schools” provision in the state Constitution; however, state-run “special
schools” have historically referred to institutions for the blind and deaf (Downey 2011b)2 or
more recently, as vocational trade schools, schools for exceptional children, or schools for adult
education (Gwinnett County School District 7). Fundamentally, the majority of the Georgia Su-

1

The seven school systems include Gwinnett, Atlanta, DeKalb, Bulloch, Candler, Henry, and Griffin public schools.
The Georgia Supreme Court majority disagreed with the state’s argument that the “special schools” provision in
the Georgia Constitution of 1983 applied to charter schools because of the reasons outlined above and also because
no charter schools existed in Georgia in 1983 (Gwinnett County School District 8, 2011).
2
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preme Court rejected the argument that merely labeling a commission-chartered school as “special” was enough to distinguish it as such. With the charter school defense unable to prove that
such schools qualified as “special schools” the Georgia Supreme Court, in a 4-to-3 decision, reversed the Fulton County Superior Court decision and struck down the GCSC as unconstitutional. The ruling basically left 16 commission-chartered schools with illegal charters and some
15,000 students without a school to attend (Dodd 2011).
1.1.2

Campaign for a Charter School Amendment

In the face of the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling and the now defunct GCSC, the Georgia General Assembly began working to propose a constitutional amendment to voters that (if
approved) would essentially give itself the power the state high court said it did not have. In the
beginning of 2012, Senate Republicans asserted that amending the Constitution to “require local
school boards to pass on local money to state-sponsored charter schools” was among its top priority (Torres 2012). In January, 2012 the amendment, House Resolution 1162, was introduced
and contention quickly grew. Most of the controversy surrounding the charter school amendment
centered on efforts to uncover the true purpose of the amendment.
Proponents of the GCSC and the amendment frequently claimed that a state commission
was necessary to implement charter schools as the process was often stymied by local boards,
despite the fact that Georgia charter schools grew from 35 to 119 in just a seven year period; furthermore, the GCSC only chartered 8 operational schools during its less than 3 year existence
(Downey 2012a). Others, like Tim Callahan of the Professional Association of Georgia Educators, claimed that the real purpose of the amendment was about “tapping into local funds without
the local board having approved the charter school” (Downey 2012a). Opponents feared that the
amendment would allow the state to essentially create its own “parallel K-12 system” and fund it
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though voiceless local systems under the guise that charter schools equal success, for which little
empirical evidence exists (Downey 2012a). As a whole, the opposition to the charter school
amendment is most easily classified as a coalition of interest groups. Professional educational
and civil rights groups came out in overwhelming numbers to voice their disapproval for
Amendment 1 including the Georgia Association of Educational Leaders (GAEL), the Georgia
School Boards Association (GSBA), The League of Women Voters of Georgia, and the NAACP
(Robinson 2012; Blau 2012).
From a partisan perspective, the charter school debate highlights an even more fervent
dynamic between state Republicans and Democrats. Firstly, the charter school amendment was
one of the top legislative priorities among a Republican-dominated legislature which drew little
support from Democrats (Wingfield 2012). Secondly, the burgeoning movement toward charter
schools since 2008 enjoyed great support from both Republican Georgia governors; in May, present governor Nathan Deal even went as far to promise state funding to a few schools who lost
their charter (as a result of the state Supreme Court’s ruling) contingent upon the passage of the
amendment in the 2012 General Election in November (Thornton 2012). On the other hand, the
State Democratic Party outright opposed the amendment, financial provisions from out-of-state
wealthy Republicans were heavily scrutinized, and “civil-rights icon” Rev. Joseph Lowery
“slammed [the proposed amendment] in a radio ad…as a precursor to resegregation” (Wingfield
2012).
However, partisan affiliation does not predict support or opposition for either side. For
example, Georgia State Schools Superintendent Dr. John Barge, a Republican, outlined the reasons he opposed the amendment in a statement three months prior to the election: “I cannot support the creation of a new and costly state bureaucracy that takes away local control of schools
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and unnecessarily duplicates the good work already being done by local districts” (Downey
2012b). All things together, this suggests that the rallying forces for and against charter schools
consisted of broad, diverse coalitions rather than restrictive partisan groupings.
Attempting to draw a line for amendment support down party lines is even messier when
we take the disjointed Tea Party into consideration. Throughout the debate, the Georgia Tea Party struggled to find a unified voice in the face of the charter school amendment. For example, the
Savannah Tea Party strongly endorsed the amendment claiming that there was nothing but positive benefits to be gained, while Atlanta Tea Party activists agreed with the opposition movement
that such an amendment was an unnecessary expansion of government power (Barrow 2012a).
Interestingly, “both tea party camps say their position is rooted in tea party principles, like small
government, local control and market competition” (Barrow 2012a). But despite all of the lawsuits and rulings, the contention between politicians and the school board, and the ardent activism between Democratic and Republican leaders, the only thing that mattered now was how
Georgia citizens would vote in the November election.
1.1.3

Voting Behavior

The heart of this study analyzes the percent “yes” vote for Amendment 1 across all 159
counties of Georgia. The purpose of this analysis is to estimate which demographic, political,
and/or educational “need” variables most likely led to the 58 to 42 percent victory of the charter
school amendment. Georgia’s Amendment 1 is a superior case for charter school analysis, not
only because it provides insight into a nationwide political and educational trend, but also because Georgia was the first state to amend its constitution in support of charter schools
(O’Sullivan 2013). Secondly, analyzing the voters who are and are not receptive to charter
schools could serve as a very useful tool for other states looking to make charter schools a bigger
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part of their educational environment. Lastly, a general analysis of this rather unique piece of
legislation provides invaluable information on the democratic process, checks and balances in
state government, and sheds new light on voter behavior on charter school state ballot propositions.
Because there is no specific literature which solely focuses on voting behavior on state
charter school ballot propositions, the theoretical model for this study consists of an amalgamation of voting behavior, state ballot proposition, and tax initiative literature. Most studies on voting behavior in ballot measures identify several key demographic and political variables that
drive support and participation including race, persons aged over 65, college education, income,
homeownership, and party identification (Sears and Citrin 1982; Button 1993; Jung 2002;
Branton 2003; Dyck 2010). Therefore, we should expect these variables to have some type of
influence in the model for this analysis. According to James Button’s (1993, 38) study on racial
cleavages in local voting, he found that African Americans more consistently supported educational ballot measures than Whites. Building off Button, this study recognizes that strong racial
cleavages have the capacity to divide regions along the traditional sense of a “color line” which
can significantly impact voter preferences. Therefore, we should expect to see substantial variance in support for the charter school amendment between rural and metropolitan areas especially considering that nearly 70 percent of the entire African American population in Georgia reside
in the state’s three largest metropolitan areas: Atlanta, Augusta, and Columbus.3
Several studies analyzing voting behavior on SPLOST (Special Purpose Local Option
Sales Tax) initiatives in Georgia are also relevant to this analysis because one of the chief concerns by amendment opponents is that a state charter school commission, which aims to reappor-
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This hypothesis is also in accordance with Sanders and Lee’s 2009 analysis of 398 ESPLOST initiatives where the
authors find significant variance in ESPLOST support between metro and rural counties.
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tion local dollars, could put an unnecessary burden on taxpayers. This anti-tax sentiment is often
operationalized in SPLSOT studies by examining the percentage of persons aged over 65 while
more general economic self-interest variables analyze percentage of homeowners and household
income per county (Jung 2002; Sanders and Lee 2009; LaPlant and LaPlant 2012). In accordance
with these previous works, this study also expects to find a significant relationship between these
economic self-interest variables and support for Amendment 1.
Lastly, this study incorporates a handful of sociological and educational studies to develop “educational need” variables for the purposes of this analysis; the “need” for charter schools
is most frequently operationalized by graduation rates, drop out rates and standardized test scores
(Archbald 2004; Lauen 2009; Davies and Aurini 2011). This study exclusively analyzes graduation rates in order to avoid problems with collinearity instead of assessing graduation and dropout rates together. Together, the political history leading to the charter school aendment and the
literature on voting behavior guides a set of expected results.
1.2

Expected Results
According to the most relevant political science literature associated with this analysis

and the history of the charter schools debate in Georgia we can expect certain variable directionalities in our dataset. First in terms of our demographic variables, if the statements were true that
the Georgia electorate was fearful that the passage of Amendment 1 would increase property taxes and create an unnecessary tax burden then we would expect counties with a higher percentage
of persons aged 65 and over to have a negative impact on the “yes” vote for the amendment,
which would be in accordance with all of the aforementioned SPLOST studies in Georgia. Conversely, counties with a higher percentage of persons aged 18 and younger may represent a demographic “need” for better schools. As the youth percentage increases among counties we ex-
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pect support to increase for Amendment 1. Race is another key issue in this analysis. Recalling
Button’s work, we would expect counties with a higher African American population to vote yes
for the amendment as well. Household income is another variable we expect to vary in interaction with other variables. To one extent we expect more affluent areas to support charter schools
because they have the capacity to spot local funding; while on the other hand, less affluent areas
may also support charter schools as a means to improve the educational system. We should expect support to change among race and partisanship as the levels of household income vary as
this is one of the best self-interested economic variables in the dataset.
Second, if the premier argument for charter school advocacy rests upon the “need” for
educational reform, then there are several variables that should elucidate this claim. One of such
variables includes graduation rates. The lower the graduation rate by county, the more support
we should expect for Amendment 1. Per pupil spending (PPS) is another measure that should
validate the claim that charter schools will assuage failing systems. School systems with low PPS
may contribute to underperformance, leading parents to seek charter schools as an alternative
educational path for their children. We should also approach the issue of PPS with a caveat.
More money does not always equal more success. As a matter of fact, comparing PPS to the
most recent Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) report from the Department of Education indicates
that some of the worst school systems in Georgia receive the most funding. Therefore, counties
with higher PPS may also be more inclined to support Amendment 1. Lastly, we examine the
average score on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) by county to assess performance. Again,
counties with lower aggregate SAT scores may be inclined to support Amendment 1.
Lastly, we will examine several political predictors of the Amendment 1 “yes” vote. The
primary political predictor for this study is the percentage of Republican voters in the county.
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Since the amendment was almost singularly a Republican initiative in the Georgia legislature, we
would expect Republican constituents to vote in favor of the amendment. Keeping in mind that
Georgia republicans were also divided on the amendment, especially differing Tea Party coalitions, we have also incorporated a variable which measure factionalism by county. The precursory idea is that support for the amendment will be greater in counties where the Republican party
is more unified. Turnout is another measure that we expect to capture voting sentiment on the
amendment. According to Jung’s (2002, 26) SPLOST referenda study, he uncovered an inverse
relationship between the “yes” vote and turnout. If the “yes” vote decreases while turnout increases, it should speak to the magnitude of support for the amendment. Finally, we examine a
geopolitical measure which examines the “yes” vote among rural and metropolitan areas in
Georgia. Because charter schools are often associated with affluence, we expect the “yes” vote to
increase in metropolitan areas.
2

METHODOLOGY

The dependent variable of this study is the percent “yes” vote by county across all 159
Georgia counties. The dependent variable is coded as a percentage rather than a dichotomous
variable so we can obtain the most precise results possible. Considering the characteristics of the
data we employ the use of an Ordinary Least-Squares Regression Model. In order to account for
heteroskedasticity among the 11 key independent variables of analysis, the model also uses robust standard errors. The remainder of this section explains in depth how the independent variables of analysis were obtained, measured, coded and also displays the general characteristics of
each variable.
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2.1

Data and Variables
This study examines the “yes” vote for Amendment 1 in the November 2012 General

Election in Georgia as the dependent variable across all 159 counties. Each county was coded
with its respective percentage “yes” vote for Amendment 1. The independent variables of this
study consist of demographic, educational “need” and political variables which are theoretically
expected to predict the outcome of the election. Since the dependent variable unit of analysis is a
county-level measure, all independent variables are coded as aggregate county measures. The
following sections explain the operationalization of variables in detail.
2.1.1

Demographics

As suggested from a broad literature on voting behavior, tax initiative referenda, and ballot propositions, this study analyzes five major demographic predictors. Percentage of persons
aged 65 and older, percentage of persons 18 and under, percentage with a Bachelor’s degree,
percentage African American, and average household income were all obtained from the Census
Bureau State and County QuickFacts for the year 2012. All independent variables in this section
are measured as aggregate percentages while the household income variable is reported as an average measure for each county.
2.1.2

Educational “Need”

To test whether educational “need” was a significant factor in the “yes” vote for
Amendment 1 we analyze three variables: graduation rates, per pupil spending, and composite
SAT scores. Four-year graduation rate data for the 2012 school year was obtained to assess
“need” for alternative school choice options.4 This measure captures the percentage of students
in each county who are expected to graduate “on time” or within 4 years. Per pupil expenditures

4

Data obtained from the Atlanta Journal Constitution online database http://www.myajc.com/news/ga-grad-rates2012/
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were obtained from the financial reports of the Georgia Department of Education for 2012.5
Lastly, composite SAT scores were collected for each county in 2012. This measure includes the
average composite score among students for the entire county. 6
2.1.3

Political Predictors

The last group of variables examine four political predictors of the “yes” vote. First, the
average GOP vote in presidential elections from 2000-2012 was calculated as a proxy for Republicanism in each county.7 For all four elections, the total number of votes cast for the GOP presidential candidate was calculated as a percentage of the entire vote from each county. Percentages
for each year were then averaged to yield a comprehensive measure of Republicanism for each
county.
Capturing party dynamics at the county level can be difficult to measure. In association
with the GOP measure, another variable has been created which aims to account for divisions (or
factionalism) within the Republican Party. Since votes cast in a presidential election might not
have the capacity to illuminate the nuances of local politics, a gubernatorial measure aims to capture the degree of factionalism in the GOP by county. Analyzing the 2010 Republican Gubernatorial Primary races by county may paint a more accurate picture of party dynamics in Georgia.
For each county, the Republican gubernatorial candidate who received the second-most votes
was subtracted from the candidate who received the most votes in that county.8 Therefore, smaller values on this measure indicate there was a greater deal of competition, or that the GOP may
have been factionalized. Larger values of this measure are interpreted to indicate cohesion

5

Values refer to the Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) student expenditures. Data obtained from the Georgia Department
of Education online financial report database. http://app3.doe.k12.ga.us/owsbin/owa/fin_pack_revenue.display_proc
6
Data obtained from AJC online database: http://www.myajc.com/news/ga-sat-scores-2013/
7
Election results available for all years available at the Georgia Secretary of State website.
8
2010 Republican gubernatorial primary election results can be found at the Georgia Secretary of State Website.
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(unifactionalism) in the party. This measure is intended to illuminate not only divisions within
the GOP itself, but also the lack of unity between the two Tea Party camps positioned on each
side of the charter school debate.
Turnout percentages were obtained from the election returns of the 2012 General Election
from the Georgia Secretary of State.9 Lastly, the model also accounts for whether each county is
part of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Rural counties are coded 0 and metropolitan counties are coded as 1.10 Variable characteristics including minimum, maximum, and mean values
can be found in the appendix.
3

RESULTS

The following sections present the preliminary results of the OLS model and offer several
explanations for the findings. In particular, this section examines how county-level dynamics,
interactions between key independent variables, and the ballot language of the amendment influenced the “yes” vote.
3.1

Preliminary Results
The table below represents the preliminary results of our model. Notice that Table 3.1

consists of two separate models. Two of our independent variables, “Republican” and “Percent
Black”, are highly correlated; for this reason two models have been created to adequately show
the significance of each variable in the model.11 Model 1, which includes the GOP measure, returned with six statistically significant variables.

9

Data obtained from: www.sos.ga.gov
Data from the Census Bureau on Metropolitan Statistical Areas
http://www.census.gov/population/metro/data/defhist.html
11
Independent variables “Republican” and “Percentage Black” were correlated at -0.9011, indicating that both are
nearly identically inverted measures of one another. Therefore, running two separate models demonstrates the predictive power of both variables.

10

15

Table 3.1 OLS Regression of “Yes” Votes on Amendment 1
Standard
Coefficient Error p-value

Model 1
Variable
Demographics

Model 2
Variable

Standard
Coefficient Error p-value

Demographics

Percent Over 65

.548

.250

.030

Percent Over 65

.459

.243

.061

Percent 18 and
Under

-.035

.272

.897

Percent 18 and
Under

-.182

.280

.518

Percent with
Bachelor’s

-.069

.138

.619

Percent with
Bachelor’s

.077

.128

.550

Percent Black

--

--

--

Percent Black

.169

.048

.001

Household
Income

.000

.000

.000

Household
Income

.000

.000

.000

Educational Need

Educational Need

Graduation Rate

-.115

.058

.051

Graduation Rate

-.115

.062

.066

Per Pupil
Spending

-.000

.001

.955

Per Pupil
Spending

.000

.000

.663

Average SAT

.003

.009

.772

Average SAT

-.003

.009

.716

--

--

--

Political Predictors

Political Predictors

Republican

-.315

.067

.000

Republican

Faction

.012

.042

.771

Faction

.031

.043

.470

Turnout

-.203

.076

.009

Turnout

-.265

.087

.003

Metro Area

3.120

1.247

.014

Metro Area

4.010

1.285

.002

N=152
F-14.02
r2=.052

N=152
F=15.19
r2=0.50

Percent over 65, household income and metropolitan areas all had positive coefficients. We can
interpret these results as following: counties with higher percentages of persons aged over 65,
with higher household incomes, in metropolitan areas were most likely to vote “yes” for the
amendment. On the other hand, graduation rates, how Republican a county is, and magnitude of
turnout were all negative predictors of the “yes” vote. Some of these results counter our original
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expectations. The remainder of this section aims to explain these results and offer supplemental
models.
First, we will talk about the directionalities we correctly predicted for Model 1.
Household income was correctly predicted to have a significant impact on the percent “yes” vote
for Amendment 1. Again, this most likely captures the reality that charter schools thrive in more
affluent areas because of the need for financial donations.
The relationship between graduation rates and support for Amendment 1 were also correctly predicted. According to the model, as graduation rates increase, which aim to serve as a
proxy for successful educational systems, support for the amendment decreases. Therefore,
Georgians in school districts with higher graduation rates may have not seen a “need” for educational improvement and voted against the amendment.
Turnout was also a significant predictor in the model and reaffirmed the Jung’s findings
on SPLOST referenda. In regards to Amendment 1, counties with higher turnout rates were significantly less likely to vote “yes” for the amendment. As Jung suggests, it may be the case that
charter school legislation is more likely to pass in special elections which typically have lower
turnout than general elections (Jung 2002, 27).
Lastly, metropolitan areas were a strong predictor of support for the amendment as expected. Support in these areas is likely attributable to higher affluence and the black vote. This
relationship is highlighted in Model 2, which incorporates the African American variable, where
the p-value for metropolitan areas increases from .014 to .002. This result also confirms Button’s
work that African Americans are much more likely to support educational ballot propositions.
Shifting to our variables which yielded counter-intuitive results, percent over 65, was a
positive predictor, which was unexpected. It may be the case that older Georgians were more
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knowledgeable about the amendment, or that this group is more likely to have children/grandchildren and are more invested in the issue. Following tables will examine interactions
effects to determine if any such relationships exist.
However, what is perhaps most interesting about the results is that the GOP average
measure has a negative coefficient. What this means is that as a county becomes more Republican, the likelihood it will support Amendment 1 decreases. This is a striking result because the
amendment itself was largely a Republican effort in the Georgia legislature, and according to the
literature, Republicans tend to support charter schools more than Democrats. Interpreting these
results in the same manner as above, for every 1 percent increase in the Republican measure the
“yes” vote for Amendment 1 decreases by .31 percent. The following section aims to clarify these counter-intuitive results.
3.1.1

The County-Level Dynamic
Since our model does not show support for Amendment 1 among the Republican elec-

torate this leads us to first think that perhaps the GOP measure we have created does not adequately capture the nuances of local politics. Therefore, the following tables try to account for
these shortcomings. Theoretically speaking, we should see differences between rural and metropolitan Republicans in Georgia (Gimpel and Karnes 2006).12 Therefore, each county’s metropolitan status has been designated by our metropolitan variable (1=metro 0=rural). Juxtaposing metro and rural areas, we can see a clearer image of county-level dynamics. Table 3.2 shows the results for Models 1 and 2 in metropolitan counties only.
Notice when we control for metropolitan counties the percent of the population with a
Bachelor’s degree becomes statistically significant with a negative coefficient. In other words,
12

Gimpel and Karnes’ “The Rural Side of the Urban-Rural Gap” argue there are major differences in voting behavior between rural and urban residents even within the same state. Their data shows that the rural American vote is
becoming increasingly Republican while more populous areas appear markedly less so.
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for every 1 percent increase in persons with a Bachelor’s degree support for Amendment 1 decreases by .46 percent.
Table 3.2 OLS Regression of “Yes” Votes on Amendment 1 in Metropolitan Counties
Model 1
Variable

Standard
Coefficient Error p-value

Demographics

Model 2
Variable

Standard
Coefficient Error p-value

Demographics

Percent Over 65

-.382

.397

.340

Percent Over 65

-.665

.335

.052

Percent 18 and
Under

-.560

.435

.204

Percent 18 and
Under

-.957

.389

.017

Percent with
Bachelor’s

-.461

.159

.006

Percent with
Bachelor’s

-.373

.145

.013

Percent Black

--

--

--

Percent Black

.309

.057

.000

Household
Income

.000

.000

.000

Household
Income

.000

.000

.000

Educational Need

Educational Need

Graduation Rate

-.010

.089

.906

Graduation Rate

-.037

.069

.588

Per Pupil
Spending

-.000

.001

.558

Per Pupil
Spending

-.000

.001

.811

Average SAT

.002

.010

.823

Average SAT

.006

.011

.550

--

--

--

Political Predictors

Political Predictors

Republican

-.412

.082

.000

Republican

Faction

.011

.054

.838

Faction

.003

.056

.961

Turnout

-.134

.086

.125

Turnout

-.250

.087

.006

N = 66
F=13.62
r2 = 0.61

N = 66
F=16.06
r2 = 0.66

The negative relationship between education and support for Amendment 1 is also elucidated in a
public opinion poll by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution from October 2012. According to the
poll, persons with no college education supported the amendment by 45 percent, while those
with a college education only supported the amendment by 38 percent; furthermore, 53 percent
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of those with a college education favor strengthening public schools while those with no college
education only support strengthening schools by 49 percent (Charter School Amendment Poll
2012). When it comes to supporting more options for school choice, college educated and noncollege educated support is 37 and 41 percent respectively (Charter School Amendment Poll
2012). Educated persons likely oppose the amendment because they believe that the best way to
strengthen schools is by improving the preexisting educational infrastructure. More educated
persons may also be aware of how the amendment would negatively affect local school funding.
Household income and the Republican measure remain significant predictors in Model 1.
Table 3.2 shows that Republicans in metropolitan areas are still less likely to support the
amendment, but what is most fascinating are the results from Model 2. When we control for metropolitan areas in Model 2 every single demographic variable is significant. Again, this speaks to
the importance of the black vote for the amendment. Demographics may have a greater explanatory power than partisanship when it comes to analyzing who is most likely to support the charter
schools amendment in metropolitan areas. Below, Table 3.3 breaks down the models by rural
counties. Interestingly, Model 1 (GOP Model) does a much better job at predicting the “yes” vote
in rural counties than it does in metropolitan counties. These tables reaffirm Gimpel and Karnes’
(2006) findings that there in fact appears to be a wide gap between rural and urban voting behavior. Most directionalities of independent variables are consistent through each model, except for
the education variable. Notice, when we reduce the model to rural counties only, percent with a
Bachelor’s degree becomes a positive predictor of the “yes” vote for both the GOP Model and
the Black Model. Persons from rural counties clearly have a different attitude about charter
schools.
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Table 3.3 OLS Regression of “Yes” Votes on Amendment 1 in Rural Counties
Model 1
Variable

Coefficient

Standard
Error p-value

Demographics

Model 2
Variable

Coefficient

Standard
Error p-value

Demographics

Percent Over 65

.644

.270

.020

Percent Over 65

.437

.275

.117

Percent 18 and
Under

-.205

.278

.464

Percent 18 and
Under

-.386

.308

.214

Percent with
Bachelor’s

.490

.228

.035

Percent with
Bachelor’s

.623

.232

.009

Percent Black

--

--

--

Percent Black

.108

.076

.160

Household
Income

.000

.000

.039

Household
Income

.000

.000

.157

Educational Need

Educational Need

Graduation Rate

-.203

.076

.009

Graduation Rate

-.186

.089

.041

Per Pupil
Spending

-3.19

.001

.998

Per Pupil
Spending

.000

.001

.467

Average SAT

.011

.012

.354

Average SAT

-.000

.001

.467

--

--

--

Political Predictors

Political Predictors

Republican

-.353

.093

.000

Republican

Faction

.086

.065

.184

Faction

.086

.074

.246

Turnout

-.379

.149

.013

Turnout

-.399

.171

.023

N=86
F=8.25
r2=0.38

N=86
F=5.39
r2=0.31

We can draw several distinctions about the charter school amendment from these models.
First, race is more important in metropolitan areas than rural areas. The Black Metro Model from
Table 3.2 yielded six statistically significant variables as opposed to the three significant variables yielded from the GOP Metro Model. Second, every single demographic predictor was significant in the Black Model. Third, no educational or political predictors were significant in the
Black Metropolitan Model, expect for turnout. Therefore, we can be confident that demographics
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played a major role influencing the “yes” vote in metropolitan counties. On the other hand, the
Rural Model tells a different story. With completely inverse results, the GOP Rural Model yieldy
ed six statistically significant variables while the Black Rural Model only yielded three. The
GOP Rural Model shows significant predictors in all three categories (demographic, educational
“need”, and political). Fascinatingly, percent African America
American
n was not even statistically signifisignif
cant in the Black Rural Model. This may lead one to conclude that support for Amendment 1 was
based more on race and demographics in metropolitan areas while support in rural areas was
more political or “need” based.
Below, Figure 3.1 highlights the percent “yes” vote by county type. Of the 159 counties
in Georgia, 83 voted in favor of Amendment 1 (52 percent). Majority of “yes” votes came from
metropolitan areas while nearly 75 percent of the “no” vote came from rural counties. Only a
quarter of metropolitan counties voted against the amendment.
Metro Yes Vote

Rural Yes Vote

Rural No Vote
36%

Metro No Vote

Rural No Vote

Metro Yes Vote
31%

Rural Yes Vote
Metro No Vote
21%
12%

Figure 3.1 Percent “Yes” Vote by County Type
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3.1.2

Interaction Effects
The previous sections have argued that county-level dynamics, such as whether a county

is rural or metropolitan may have influenced voters’ support for Amendment 1. This section argues there are key ways in which the main independent variables of interest interact with one another that may also influence the “yes” vote.
Below, Table 3.4 examines three different types of interaction effects between the average GOP measure and percent African American. Here we are interested in determining how
both models react when interacted with other significant variables. In the GOP Interaction Model
we have interacted the average Republican vote variable with percent with a Bachelor’s degree,
percent 65 and over and turnout. Percent 65 and over was chosen as an interaction term because
we originally expected this variable to yield a negative coefficient. Interacting this variable with
the average Republican vote may shed light on why both variables produced counter-intuitive
findings. Percent with a Bachelor’s degree was chosen because the directionality of coefficients
shifted when controlling for metropolitan and rural areas. Lastly, the turnout measure is used an
interaction term to test for consistency in its significance and directionality. The Black Interaction Model tests the same three interactions with the percent African American variable.
The GOP Interaction Model from Table 3.4 yields seven statistically significant results.
When controlling for the GOP interaction terms, the percent over 65 coefficient becomes negative, as we originally expected. Furthermore, the interaction terms between the average Republican vote and percent with a Bachelor’s degree and percent over 65 are significant with positive
coefficients. These interactions tell us a lot about the effect of how “Republican” a county is and
its effect on the “yes” vote for Amendment 1. Without taking interaction terms into account, the
“Republican” proxy for counties had a negative relationship with the dependent variable.
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Table 3.4 OLS Regression of “Yes” Votes on Amendment 1 with Interaction Variables
Model 1
Variable

Standard
Coefficient Error p-value

Demographics

Model 2
Variable

Standard
Coefficient Error p-value

Demographics

Percent Over 65

-2.091

.920

.024

Percent Over 65

1.068

.286

.000

Percent 18 and
Under

-.025

.271

.925

Percent 18 and
Under

-.079

.297

.791

Percent with
Bachelor’s

-.698

.267

.010

Percent with
Bachelor’s

.095

.186

.611

Percent Black

--

--

--

Percent Black

.302

.350

.390

Household
Income

.000

.000

.000

Household
Income

.000

.000

.000

Educational Need

Educational Need

Graduation Rate

-.135

.057

.019

Graduation Rate

-.136

.063

.034

Per Pupil
Spending

-.000

.000

.841

Per Pupil
Spending

.000

.000

.740

Average SAT

-.000

.009

.932

Average SAT

-.008

.008

.356

--

--

--

Political Predictors

Political Predictors

Republican

-.228

.382

.551

Republican

Faction

-.011

.046

.800

Faction

.005

.044

.902

Turnout

.481

.450

.283

Turnout

-.343

.152

.025

Metro Area

3.56

1.239

.005

Metro Area

3.870

1.304

.004

Interactions

Interactions

GOP*Bachelors

.010

.005

.034

Black*Bachelors

-.002

.004

.586

GOP*65

.039

.013

.003

Black*65

-.029

.008

.000

GOP*Turnout

-.011

.007

.152

Black*Turnout

.004

.006

.460

N = 152
F=21.32
r2 = 0.54

N = 152
F=16.01
r2 = 0.53

However, when we examine how “Republican” a county is respective to the percentage of Bachelor degrees within that county, the model yields a positive and highly significant relationship.
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The same is true for the relationship between the average Republican measure and the
percent of the population aged 65 and over. The more “Republican” a county becomes is a significant predictor of support for Amendment 1 when interacted with the percent of the population
aged over 65. In the Black Interaction Model we see that the percent over 65 variable coefficient
is positive and significant, as it has been in most models; however, when percent over 65 is interacted with percent African American, the term yields a negative coefficient. The results from this
table may indicate that age plays a significant role in the charter school debate. If we treat the
average Republican vote and percent African American measures as proxies for conservatism
and liberalism respectively, then we might conclude that older conservative s were more likely to
support the amendment while older liberals were less likely to support the amendment. Furthermore, considering that the Georgia Democratic Party outright opposed Amendment 1 may have
signaled hardcore democrats, especially blacks aged 65 and over who grew up during the Civil
Rights movement, may have simply followed that State Party’s lead, even though African Americans are more likely to support educational ballot propositions. Overall, the Interaction Models
contribute to our understanding of which types of coalitions were most likely to support or oppose the amendment.
3.1.3

Ballot Language

The last area to examine regarding Amendment 1 is the ballot language itself. It would
not be much of a stretch to say that for many Georgians, the first time they had heard or even
read about the propositions for Amendment 1 may have been when they deciding whether or not
to vote “yes” at their polling place. For those who may have been unfamiliar with the amendment, the ballot language itself seemed rather innocent. The official ballot language for Amendment 1 read as follows: Shall the Constitution of Georgia be amended to allow state or local ap-
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proval of public charter schools upon the request of local communities? Notice that nowhere is
any mention made to the extraneous State Commission that would be created (or reinstated) to
override decisions made by local school boards. Nor is there any mention made on the fact that
the approving the amendment would allow the state to take public money away from local school
systems and give that money to the same charter schools that had previously been denied application by the local system.
Opponents of the amendment argued that the ballot language was “intentionally misleading” and was likely the chief reason why the amendment passed by such a large margin of 58.542.5 (Bailey-Covin 2012). Even State Senator Vincent Ford (D-Atlanta) accused proponents of
“using vague ballot language…to confuse voters about the real intent of the proposal” (Barrow
2012b). It is certainly a fact that out of the nearly 3.8 million votes cast for Amendment 1 there
were at least a few voters who had never even heard of the charter school amendment until they
were already casting their votes. Bearing this in mind, it is certainly true that a large number of
Georgia voters were likely hoodwinked into voting “yes” for a constitutional amendment they
knew little about. As a matter of fact, after the election there were a flurry of reports from Georgia voters who claimed they were unsure of what the amendment would actually do. This may
also explain why the amendment passed with 58.5 percent electoral support, 11 percentage
points higher than a local poll just weeks before the election (Huddleston 2012). The ballot language for the amendment should not be overlooked as a major component that lead to the 17
point margin of victory.
4

CONCLUSIONS

In sum, this research has presented a handful of models which aimed to predict support
for the charter schools amendment. First, the research has shown that there are vast differences
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among voters and their perception towards charter schools in rural and metropolitan areas. The
Metropolitan Model showed that demographics including age, race, income and education were
the best predictors of support for the amendment while the rural vote was more influenced by
political and educational “need” variables. The research also shows that rural counties overwhelming voted against the amendment, but the tremendous support from metropolitan counties
ultimately led to the amendment’s passage on Election Day. It makes sense that the amendment
gained major support from metropolitan counties considering that the bottom five performing
high schools, middle schools, and elementary schools for the entire state are found exclusively in
the Atlanta, Fulton, and Cobb County school systems (Best, worst schools 2013).
The Interaction Models also demonstrated that age and partisanship were major predictors of support. If we treat the interaction of the average Republican vote and percentage of persons over 65 as a coalition of conservatism and the interaction of percent black with percent over
65 as a coalition of liberalism, there are clear divisions of support and opposition respectively.
Lastly, examining the ballot language itself explains why the amendment passed by such a large
margin of victory. Together, this research paints an intricate picture of charter school support by
examining county-level dynamics, key interaction effects, and the actual substance of the
amendment itself.
Even though most of the models incorrectly predicted support for Amendment 1 among
Republicans and seniors, we may have simply misclassified their positions. It may be the case
that Republicans in the electorate captured anti-tax sentiment, not Georgia seniors, which would
have made the model more accurate. As mentioned earlier, counties with more persons aged over
65 may represent more individuals with children and grandchildren, causing this demographic
group to be more invested in the quality of education. However, no one model presented in this
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research was able to show a positive significant relationship between percent over 65 and percent
under 18 at the same time.
This study raises several important questions regarding the future of charter
schools in the United States. Are charter schools really the answer to failing traditional school
systems? There exists an impressive literature relating successful movements towards charter
schools linked with the revitalization of traditional community structure (Warren 2005). The author argues that the most successful initiatives towards educational reform are complimented by
strong community structures. Simply implanting a charter school into a dysfunctional community
provides no guarantee for success just like transplanting failing democracies in a war-torn counties. Then there is the debate over whether or not charter schools are more successful than traditional public schools. Despite the persistent rhetoric that charter schools are the solution to failing public schools, a recent study out of Stanford University shows that only 17 percent of charter schools actually outperform their traditional counterparts (Cox 2011).
Lastly, this analysis makes clear that the charter school debate in Georgia was far more
complicated than a Republican legislature pushing through conservative legislation in a red state.
On the contrary, this study demonstrates that the charter school debate was contested most in
partisan counties.13 The charter school debate should be understood not as a battle between ideologues, but rather as a broad coalition of the college educated, seniors, African Americans, the
affluent, rural and metropolitan citizens alike fighting to improve the future of the educational
system for Georgia students. Georgia received national attention as a result of the Amendment 1
13

Though the “Faction” variable was not a significant predictor of support in any of the models there are some interesting facts that should be observed. The mean faction score for Georgia counties was 9.08, or that the average
Gubernatorial candidate won by 9 points. When we examine faction scores below the mean, which range all the way
to .14, we end up with 78 “factionalized” to “highly factionalized” counties. From these 52.6 percent voted against
Amendment 1. Even when we examine factionalism scores above the mean which range all the way to
“unifactionalism” 43.2 percent of those counties also voted against the amendment. This is powerful evidence that
Amendment 1 was not a singularly partisan issue.
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victory, becoming the first state to amend its constitution to support charter schools (Klein,
2012). Only time will tell what kind of precedent Georgia has set for the rest of the nation.
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APPENDIX
Variables, Characteristics and Sources
Variables

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Standard
Deviation

25.75

71.44

50.53

8.80

3.7

30.9

13.95

3.70

14.6

29.7

12.89

2.95

4.7

47.6

15.81

8.48

.7

73

28.35

17.23

20.44

81.05

60.88

12.47

.14

57.03

13.09

11.60

0

1

.433

.497

Population by County (2010)

246

949599

61654.65

129950.5

Median Household
Income (2006-2010)

22188

87605

40222.14

11348.45

45.3

93.3

73.10

9.08

4307.76

10535.48

5758.80

695.4158

1027

1580

1347.9

96.67

36.25

85.82

72.78

5.93

“Yes” Vote for
Amendment One
(Nov 6, 2012)
Percent of population over 65 (2011)
Percent of the population 18 and under
(2012)
Percent with a
Bachelor’s Degree
(2006-2010)
Percent Black
(2011)
Average GOP vote
in Presidential Elections (2000-2012)
Factionalism (July
2010)
Metropolitan Area
(2003)

High School Graduation Rate Percentage (2012)
Per Pupil Spending
(2012)
Average SAT Scores
Turnout

Source
GA Secretary of
State Elections
Division
Census Bureau
State and County QuickFacts
Census Bureau
State and County QuickFacts
Census Bureau
State and County QuickFacts
Census Bureau
State and County QuickFacts
GA Secretary of
State Elections
Division
GA Secretary of
State Elections
Division
Census Bureau
Metropolitan
Statistical Areas
Census Bureau
State and County QuickFacts
Census Bureau
State and County QuickFacts
Atlanta Journal
Constitution
Online Database
Georgia Department of Education
Atlanta Journal
Constitution
Online Database
Georgia Secretary of State
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